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The Meaning of “Agreement” under the Sherman
Act: Thoughts from the “Facilitating Practices”
Experience
GEORGE A. HAY?
Cornell University Law School, Ithaca NY 14853, U.S.A.

I. Introduction
While the Economic Policy Office was involved in a number of interesting and
important matters during the six years I was Director (1973–1979), for the most
part my involvement in individual investigations and cases was vicarious, i.e., supervising, supporting, and advising the staff economists assigned to the particular
matter. The one major exception – a matter in which I became personally involved
in an intensive way – was the General Electric (GE)-Westinghouse price signaling
matter. In what follows, I provide a brief summary of what transpired in the GEWestinghouse matter and then trace through some of the longer term consequences
of the Department’s efforts. I conclude with a discussion of what I regard as a still
unsettled issue in antitrust law – the precise legal meaning of “agreement” under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the relevance of the GE-Westinghouse matter for
trying to resolve that dilemma.
II. The GE-Westinghouse “Facilitating Practices” Case
For the true origin of the GE-Westinghouse matter,1 we need to go back to 1960,
when GE, Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, and four individuals were indicted for
fixing the prices of large turbine generators. The criminal case ultimately resulted
in the entry of guilty pleas by the corporate defendants and nolo contendere by the
four individual defendants which in turn resulted in fines and, in the case of one
individual, a jail sentence. The companion civil case led to a consent decree against
the corporate defendants generally prohibiting price fixing and the kinds of direct
? Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Cornell University. The author
was Director of The Economic Policy Office 1973–1979.
1 This summary is taken in large part from the Justice Department’s 1977 Competitive Impact
Statement in the Ge-Westinghouse matter. United States vs. GE Co. (1977-1) Trade Cas. (CCH) 712.
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communications that had been at the heart of the original conspiracy. Vigorous
price competition apparently prevailed in the industry from 1960 into 1963. By
1962, Allis-Chalmers had withdrawn from the market but there was still substantial
overcapacity and prices continued to decline. Relatively few sales are made in any
year and the pressure to obtain any given order was substantial. Moreover, the
product was not homogeneous and, although price books were used, there was little
adherence to published prices and considerable discounting occurred on particular
projects. However, in 1963 there was an important set of developments that, in the
Department’s opinion,2 resulted in a sudden and dramatic reduction in the degree
of competition.
Specifically, in May 1963, GE announced a new pricing policy which featured
GE’s intention to adhere to published prices on all future transactions. The revised
policy had a number of elements designed to facilitate the success of the new policy.3 A key element was a revised price book which contained simplified formulas
and procedures for determining the book price of any given turbine generator and
a published multiplier to be applied to book prices at any given time so as to
determine the actual bid prices for any given project at that time. (For example,
the published multiplier for May 1963 was 0.75, which meant that the price that
would actually be quoted to any customer would be 0.75 times the book price.)
The use of the multiplier permitted GE to make swift changes in price without the
complexity inherent in printing an entirely new price book. The combination of the
announced no-discount policy, the revised, simplified price book and the use of the
published multiplier was that it would be much easier for Westinghouse to know
what GE would bid on any given turbine generator project and therefore easier to
match GE’s price, if it wanted to.
Another key feature of the new policy was the use of “price protection” clauses
in all future contracts with customers. The clause operated in such a way that,
in the event price was lowered by GE for any given customer, any buyer within
the past six months who had paid list price would be given a retroactive discount
equal to that given the latest customer. The consequence of the price protection
clause was that selective price cuts in individual transactions could not be employed
by GE without imposing substantial penalties on itself in the form of retroactive
discounts to other customers. The result was to give assurance to Westinghouse
that GE would be adhering to its stated policy of not giving discounts.
The net effect of all aspects of the new GE policy was to make it possible
for Westinghouse to match exactly GE’s prices if it wanted to and to give some
2 Because the matter was ultimately settled, the economic conclusions in this part of the narrative
represent my own perspective and/or that of the Department. The outcome was not litigated and
there can be no presumption that the companies involved would necessarily agree with all of the
views expressed.
3 In what follows I identify only some of the major elements of the policy. Readers who are not
already familiar with the GE-Westinghouse matter can consult the Competitive Impact Statement or
other sources such as George A. Hay, ‘Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law’, Cornell
Law Review, 67, 439 (1982).
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assurance to Westinghouse that, in matching GE’s published prices, it would not
be incurring any risk of being secretly undercut by selective discounts. This did
not guarantee, of course, that Westinghouse would in fact match GE’s prices but
there would be a strong incentive to do so lest GE rescind the new policy and
the industry revert to the “cutthroat competition” that characterized the 1960-early
1963 period. In any event, any element of uncertainty was quickly eliminated when
Westinghouse published its own price book (essentially equivalent to GE’s) and
adopted its own price protection clause in 1964. (In the interim, Westinghouse
quoted prices based on GE’s published price book.) After a few initial hiccups, the
policy worked smoothly and with the result that there was a pattern of identical,
non-discounted prices for at least the next several years.
Once we thought we had a handle on what had happened and why, what remained was to come up with a legal theory to apply to the case. There was no
evidence of any formal communication or agreement between GE and Westinghouse although we were persuaded that a principal purpose of the new policy was
to eliminate price competition.4 Our way of expressing what had happened was to
say, in essence, that the independent yet parallel adoption of the new policy by GE
and Westinghouse had brought about a meeting of the minds and facilitated the
elimination of price competition. Since any new antitrust action would be brought
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it was decided to assert simply that the specific
actions taken, coupled with the intent to eliminate price competition, “constituted”
an unlawful agreement under Section 1.5
III. The Ethyl Case
The GE-Westinghouse did not lead immediately to any more facilitating practices
cases emanating from the DOJ. However, over at the FTC, Commission staff were
investigating the four producers of lead-based antiknock gasoline additives. The
staff believed that the producers had managed to eliminate, or at least substantially
reduce, price competition but, like GE and Westinghouse, without having entered
into any kind of formal cartel-type of agreement. Rather, the focus of the investiga4 GE and Westinghouse denied that their purpose had the intent or the effect to stabilize prices.

They claimed that the identical prices were the result of conscious parallelism or the exercise of price
leadership by GE and that such interdependent pricing was to be expected in a duopoly where each
company’s pricing decisions must take into account the likely decisions of the other.
5 When the Department informed GE and Westinghouse that it was prepared to file a civil antitrust
suit and indicated the relief it would seek, the parties offered to settle the matter, and provide all the
relief that was desired, so long as it was treated as a modification of the outstanding 1962 consent
decree rather than a consent in a new, freestanding, lawsuit. For reasons spelled out in the Competitive Impact Statement (based on the risks inherent in any litigation compounded by the somewhat
novel theory employed in this particular matter), the Department accepted the offer and the decree,
containing significant restrictions on future behavior, was entered in 1977. However, while the court
entered the modification of the consent decree as requested, this required merely that the court find
the modification to be in the public interest and there is no significant sense in which the court
demonstrated its agreement with the Department’s theory of what constitutes an agreement.
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tion was on certain “facilitating practices” including contractual provisions similar
to the price protection clauses in GE-Westinghouse, which had been adopted by at
least the two major producers.6
Influenced by the Department’s handling of the GE-Westinghouse matter, the
Commission issued a complaint, alleging, in keeping with the FTC’s jurisdiction,
a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, prohibiting “unfair methods of competition”. While it is clear that any violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act will
also violate the FTC Act, the Commission has generally maintained that FTC Act
goes even further than Section 1. In part to establish that proposition, the Commission made a strategic decision not to allege an agreement (tacit or explicit) in the
complaint, arguing that the parallel adoption of these facilitating practices with a
resulting adverse effect on competition could constitute a violation of Section 5.
If the Commission were successful, it felt that an important new weapon against
oligopolistic industries would be achieved, a weapon which would not depend on
the occasionally metaphysical question of whether or not some kind of agreement
existed.7
After the hearing, the administrative law judge issued an opinion solidly backing the staff’s theory of the case and granting most of the relief which was sought
and the full Commission, sitting as an appellate tribunal, upheld the findings of the
administrative law judge. However, when the case was appealed by the producers
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court had difficulty with the
several aspects of Commission’s findings.
First, there was not a complete absence of price competition. In particular, the
two newer and smaller producers frequently granted discounts. In addition, while
the two major producers generally succeeded in avoiding cash discounts, they each
made significant non-price concessions to gain additional business. In my view,
these findings were not fatal in the sense that standing alone they would not have
caused the Second Circuit to overrule the Commission. Nevertheless, the presence
of some (perhaps significant) competitive activity did color the Court’s view of the
importance of eliminating the challenged conduct.
The second “problem” with the Commission’s case was that it involved a highly
concentrated industry, in many ways a classic oligopoly. If the offensive practices
were enjoined, how could it be known whether the performance would be signifi6 E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. vs. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (1984). For details and further analysis,
see George A. Hay ‘Practices that Facilitate Cooperation: the Ethyl Case’, in J. Kwoka and L. White
(eds.), The Antitrust Revolution, 3rd ed., 1999. Specifically the practices were: (1) quoting prices on
a uniform delivered price basis; (2) announcing price increases to customers and to the press well
in advance of the effective date of the price increase; and (3) including in contracts with individual
customers a clause requiring the seller to extend to that customer any discount offered to any other
customer.
7 Coincidentally, around the time that the case was filed, I left my position at the Justice Department to go to Cornell, and the Commission staff, aware of my role in developing the Department’s
position in GE-Westinghouse, retained me to serve as their economic expert in the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge.
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cantly improved? The industry found itself in the interesting position of suggesting
that, to the extent performance was not “competitive”, that was precisely what
one would expect in a highly concentrated market. Hence, structure, not conduct,
was the villain, and enjoining the challenged conduct would not improve matters.
While this argument did not persuade either the administrative law judge or the
full Commission, the Second Circuit panel was more receptive to testimony by
defendants’ experts that, to the extent that performance was less than satisfactory,
it could be attributed entirely to the structure of the industry, and that there was no
reason to believe that performance would improve if the practices were eliminated.
Third, and perhaps most important, each of the challenged practices had been
initiated by the Ethyl Corporation when it was the only producer of lead-based
additives, in other words, when it was a monopolist (and presumably unconcerned
with coordinating its behavior with that of rivals). The inference drawn from this
by the Court was twofold: first, one could not argue that the practices were implemented for the purpose of eliminating competition (although the Commission
would argue that there was substantial evidence that the producers recognized that
this was their effect); second, given that the practices were implemented when there
was no competition to worry about, there was a strong presumption that, at least at
that time, there were (potentially significant) efficiencies that resulted from these
practices. Hence, eliminating them could not be presumed to be costless.
In light of the earlier findings questioning how much of an improvement one
could expect in the competitive vigor of the industry from elimination of the facilitating practices, the Court’s perception of the overall net benefits to be gained from
their elimination was quite different from that of the administrative law judge or
the full Commission. But it was not just the revised cost-benefit analysis which influenced the Court. Perhaps even more important was the perception of unfairness.
If these practices were at one time efficient, and were implemented by each of the
new entrants in turn primarily for efficiency reasons, was it fair now to condemn
the use of the practices simply because the Commission had concluded that, at a
given point in time, the competitive costs exceeded the benefits? Does this mean
that firms are required to abandon a practice, originally implemented for efficiency
reasons, once it is understood that the practices are contributing to the industry’s
ability to avoid vigorous price competition? Moreover, would such a standard leave
the Commission with too much scope for arbitrary rule-making?
Rather than re-argue the rightness or wrongness of the Court’s opinion, let me
simply offer some observations. First, even a classic cartel will rarely if ever succeed in completely eliminating price competition, and non-price competition, while
normally better for consumers than no competition at all, is as likely to be a symptom of the success of the cartel in eliminating price competition as an antidote to
the anticompetitive effects of the cartel. Hence, while the extent to which the cartel
did not succeed in completely eliminating (price or nonprice) competition might
properly be taken into account in the analysis, the presence of some competition
should not, by itself, end the inquiry, and the presence of even significant nonprice
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competition should not cause a court to sanction the elimination of whatever price
competition would occur absent the challenged practices.
Second, facilitating practices cases (to lump them all under one heading) will
almost by definition occur in a concentrated, i.e., oligopolistic, setting. The fact
that the industry might not function perfectly competitively without the facilitating
practices does not mean that the practices are harmless. Unfortunately, the degree
to which the practices matter will rarely be amenable to any kind of quantitative
measurement, especially if they have been in existence throughout the modern history of the industry, thereby rendering a before/after analysis impractical. If these
cases are not all to founder on the “we’re bad anyway” defense, there must be some
scope for an expert to make qualitative inferences from the sequence of events and
from the contemporaneous documents and related evidence.
Third, while the possibility of a procompetitive origin for the practices might
be evidence relevant to the calculus of whether the costs of the practices exceed
the benefits, it needn’t be determinative. Moreover, the fairness issue seems much
more acute in a private treble damages case under Section 1 (or, should it ever
occur, in a criminal prosecution), than in a Section 5 case where the only remedy
being sought is an injunction against the continuation of the practices.
Finally, concerns about the power and discretion of the Commission must be
tempered by the fact that the whole point of the FTC Act was to create an “expert”
body to determine when certain practices should be prevented.
IV. The Aftermath of Ethyl
Perhaps as a result of the Second Circuit’s decision, little more was heard of
“shared monopoly” (another name for the facilitating practices cases) for some
time. However, more recently, the concept seems to have been re-awakened, and
there have been a few interesting applications.
1. P ETROLEUM P RODUCTS
The Petroleum Products case8 was a private treble damages action under Section
1 in which the plaintiffs (several states) were appealing a district court’s grant of
summary judgment to a number of the major oil companies operating in the Western US. The basic allegations were that the oil companies had engaged in certain
actions designed to maintain high wholesale and retail prices for gasoline sold at
the wholesale level (i.e., from the defendant oil refiners to their customers, referred
to as distributers). The principle conduct alleged was that the refiners coordinated
dealer discounts from the so-called “tankwagon” price by dissemination of certain
information about their wholesale and retail prices.
8 In Re Coordinated Pretrail Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation 906 F.2d

432 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The opinion contains an excellent discussion of oligopoly pricing, including a
nice summary of the classic debate between Turner and the “pre-Chicago School”
Posner,9 and an analysis of why interdependent pricing alone cannot be the basis
of a Sherman Act violation, even though it results in prices comparable to what a
classic cartel would produce.10 The opinion also sets out nicely a set of circumstances under which a facilitating practices claim will survive in a case brought
under Section 1. The allegations were that each of the defendants engaged in
various methods of disseminating information concerning their wholesale prices,
including press releases (sometimes in advance of the effective date) and “posting”
of the prices at various locations that could be accessed by the other defendants. In
part because the distributors for each refiner were contractually bound to buy from
that refiner (i.e., they could not “shop around” for better prices from other refiners)
and in part based on other evidence, the court concluded that there could be no
purpose to the dissemination of wholesale prices other than to inform competitors
of one another’s price movements so as to make it easier for competitors to follow
those movements. Under these circumstances, “[a] jury could conclude that the oil
companies agreed, either implicitly or explicitly, to create market conditions that
would facilitate tacit or express price coordination.11 It is significant in assessing
how to fit the facilitating practices theory into a Section 1 framework that, while the
court suggested that the identified behavior might be circumstantial evidence from
which a jury could infer that an explicit agreement had taken place, it would be
enough that there was an implicit agreement to facilitate tacit coordination. While
I will develop the semantic aspects of this notion in more detail later on, I read
the court to be saying not so much that the jury could infer the existence of an
agreement from the evidence but that, in effect, the jury would be permitted to
declare that the conduct constituted an implicit agreement.12

9 Donald F. Turner, ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act’, Harvard Law Review

75, 655 (1962) Richard A. Posner, ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’,
Stanford Law Review, 21, 1562 (1969).
10 In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation 906 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1990) at 444–445. A brief excerpt: To permit an antitrust violation to be based on the
. . . price pattern in this case, without more, would require a company making wholly independent
pricing decisions to consider that the possible responses of its competitors might render it liable for
treble damages. Similarly, following another company’s price increase might very well provide the
evidence that a disgruntled customer would need to get to a jury in a treble damage antitrust suit.
It thus appears that permitting an inference of conspiracy from the parallel pricing evidence alone
would result in an anticompetitive dislocation by distorting independent pricing decisions.
11 Op. cit. at 448 (emphasis added).
12 The evidence on performance is interesting in light of the Second Circuit’s Ethyl opinion. Prices
apparently followed a “sawtooth” pattern with occasional large (and parallel) increases as discounts
were eliminated, followed over a period of time by lower prices as discounts were reinstated. The
court felt that the upward movements were large enough that a jury would be justified in concluding
that no individual firm would have initiated such large increases without some assurance that others
would follow. The fact that the price gains were partially eroded by subsequent discounting (as
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2. T HE A IRLINE TARIFF P UBLISHING (ATP) C ASE
Another recent application of the facilitating practices approach was the recent
DOJ case against the major airlines alleging that the airlines signaled one another
about possible future prices with the intent and effect of suppressing price competition.13 All the major airlines are linked by computer and all submit information
about their own fares and are able to receive information about fares of rival airlines. This fare information also provides the core of the computerized reservation
systems used by travel agents. This linking by itself was not challenged as it is
conceded that the airlines have a legitimate need for other airlines’ fares since one
airline is frequently in the position of selling to one of its own customers a seat
on another airline’s flight (often, although not always, when the passenger’s route
requires travel on both airlines to reach the final destination).
What was challenged was that the airlines allegedly used the computer link to
communicate intentions about fares to be charged in the future. As the Department’s press release indicated: “The airlines engaged in a process that involved
repeated exchanges through ATP [the computer network] of price increase proposals and counterproposals, with the effect of raising fares to consumers”. A principal
allegation was that an individual airline would indicate in the computer that a fare
increase on a given route for a given travel period would be implemented, not
immediately, but at some time in the near future, e.g., in 7 days. So, to give a very
simple example, for a traveler who wanted to go from New York to Los Angeles
on a basic coach ticket next April, the fare, if the traveler purchased the ticket
today, would be, say $1000 round trip, and that would typically be the same for all
airlines which flew that route nonstop. One of the airlines would announce that its
own fare, for travel next April, would be going up to $1100, effective in 7 days.
For travelers purchasing tickets during the 7 day window, the proposed increase
would be irrelevant, as the fares would still be identical, so the airline initiating
the fare increase would not expect to lose any sales to its competitors during this
period. The 7 day window would allow the first airline to see if its competitors
would match the price increase (effective the same day). If so, the new fares would
go into effect on the same day for all the airlines. If not, the first airline could
simply rescind the proposed increase before the end of the 7 day period, and would
not have suffered any lost sales (as it would if it had initiated the price increase
effective immediately and its rivals had not matched).
The DOJ claim was that this process allowed airlines to exchange “assurances”
about future fares in the same fashion as members of a cartel, sitting around a table
in a smoke-filled room, say, in effect, “I’ll raise prices next week if you will”.
arguably was the case in Ethyl as well) did not trouble the court. Nor did the court seem to require
any evidence of the overall level of profitability.
13 United States vs. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 836 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1993); United States vs.
Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 1994-2 Trade Cases 70,687 (D.D.C. 1994). See also Severin Borenstein, ‘Rapid Price Communication and Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994)’, in
J. Kwoka and L. White (eds.), The Antitrust Revolution, 3rd ed., 1999.
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In more complex scenarios, airlines allegedly “negotiated” the precise amount
of the increase if they had different ideas about the most profitable price.14 The
Department claimed that this use of facilitating practices constituted an illegal
agreement under Section 1. The matter was settled with a consent decree in which
the airlines agreed to eliminate advance announcement of price increases. In other
words, all announced price increases would be in effect immediately, until and
unless rescinded.
This is not the time to debate the merits of the Department’s allegations.15 However, in light of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Ethyl, it is interesting to reflect on
certain aspects of the DOJ case. First, the case was filed under Section 1; therefore,
unlike the FTC’s Section 5 complaint, agreement, of one kind or another, is an essential element. Second, the case was filed at a time when several of the defendants
were in or near bankruptcy and no one could seriously claim that anyone in the
industry was earning supra-normal profits. (Depending on the precise definition
of marginal costs, some, if not most, prices were above short-run marginal costs,
but that was true before the alleged conspiracy began and is true today. By any
historical measure, fare levels were modest.)
Third, in Ethyl, almost all price increases which were initiated during the period
covered by the complaint were matched by the other competitors. In contrast, in the
airline situation there was no such pattern. Many price increases were initiated and
later rescinded or scaled back when other airlines didn’t match them. While the
prices that were actually implemented were uniform (i.e., identical for all airlines),
that reflects the high degree of cross-price elasticity of demand and would be true in
situations of intense rivalry as well as oligopoly. It is surely the case that no airline,
when it decided to initiate a fare increase proposal, had any degree of assurance
that competitors would follow.
Fourth, the argument that prices and price levels would be about the same even
without the alleged facilitating practices because of the oligopolistic nature of the
industry and the homogeneous nature of the product was at least as plausible in
the airline situation as it was in Ethyl. Even without advance announcement, rivals
would learn of others’ pricing decisions instantaneously and reaction would normally be swift. The likelihood of a “stealth” price cut, designed to steal away large
chunks of business before rivals could react, was nil.
Finally, the claims for efficiencies from the challenged practice and for the unfairness in attacking them were as plausible as they were in Ethyl. The practice of
advance announcements was long-standing (originating in an era when fares had
to be filed with a regulator before they could be implemented). In addition, while
their significance was disputed, there were at least some demonstrable consumer
benefits. Ceteris paribus, consumers benefit from advance announcement as it allows them to buy tickets during the “window” and thereby avoid the price increase.
14 Other allegations involved the timing of the removal of discount fares.
15 I was a consultant for several of the airlines in this matter.
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At least some travel agents expressed strong support for advance announcement
and concern about the effect of mandating its elimination.
V. Facilitating Practices and the Concept of “Tacit Agreement”
One genera] way to think about these and other facilitating practices cases is to
focus on the kinds of defenses that might be raised. This provides a convenient
entree into a discussion of the concept of “tacit agreement” and the borderlines between lawful and unlawful conduct. Assuming there is no dispute that the practices
have been employed, there are basically four different arguments defendants might
make, singly or in combination.
1. “W E ’ RE N OT BAD ”
The first defense argument is that the conduct in question (not the facilitating practices, but the conduct the practices are alleged to have facilitated), while perhaps
parallel, is nevertheless perfectly consistent with individual, independent decisions
on the part of each defendant. In effect, the defendants are saying that there is
no mystery to be explained, no anticompetitive conduct that has been facilitated.
Conduct is parallel because all defendants are subject to the same underlying economic forces but that does not mean that the observed conduct is “interdependent”.
Although plaintiffs will argue that no one firm would have initiated the relevant
conduct without some assurance that its competitors would follow, each defendant
wants to respond that its conduct is rational regardless of what its competitors are
doing. (That defendants are aware of what their competitors are doing or expect
that competitors will act in a certain way is not critical.)16
I take this to have been the core of the defense in the classic Theatre Enterprises case17 where none of the defendant movie distributors was willing to license
first run films to the Crest, in suburban Baltimore instead of one of the traditional
downtown “first-run” theaters. (The longstanding tradition of area-wide exclusivity
during the initial run of a new film made it an either/or proposition and the fact
of exclusivity was not questioned by the Court.) Each of the defendant theaters
would have asserted in effect that, in light of the characteristics of the Crest and
the demographics of its customer base, it would be irrational to give a first run to
the Crest, regardless of whether its competitors did likewise. The fact that each
distributor may have anticipated that the other distributors would reach the same
16 This defense is also raised in cases where the plaintiff is trying to establish a traditional agreement (e.g., a conventional hotel-room cartel) using purely circumstantial evidence. In fact, in some
cases involving facilitating practices, the plaintiff may not even attempt to distinguish between a
classic hotel-room type agreement and a tacit agreement but may simply identify the facilitating
practices as part of a list of “plus factors” and request an instruction that an agreement can be inferred
from certain conduct not in the defendants’ individual self-interest accompanied by one or more plus
factors.
17 Theatre Enterprises vs. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 US. 537 (1954).
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conclusion is not inconsistent with the claim of independent decision making and
may even add plausibility to the claim by showing how each theater was subject to
the same underlying business forces.18
The same argument was present, at least to some extent, in Ethyl and the ATP
case as well. The parties in Ethyl asserted that the homogeneity of the product was
sufficient to explain the generally identical list prices and that competition occurred
through discounts and non-price concessions (not entirely consistent since, in perfect competition with homogeneous products, the list prices would not leave any
margin for additional discounts). In ATP, the airlines also argued that high crosselasticity in a market with good consumer information would generally lead to
identical prices and that the overall profits of the industry showed that price levels
were not, at least in the aggregate, above competitive levels.19
2. ‘W E ’ RE NATURALLY BAD ”
The second defense raised is that the facilitating practices are not responsible for
the absence of competition; the fault lies with the industry structure. To the extent
that there is an absence of competition (which would of course be disputed by
defendants) that is the result of industry structure and there would be no better
performance even if the facilitating practices were eliminated.
This was certainly an important element of the defense in Ethyl, especially for
the two largest firms for whom the lack of price competition was most evident.
Their argument was that, given the highly concentrated structure of the market, and
the ability to learn quickly (often from customers) of a rival’s price increase, the
degree of interdependence would be sufficient that a price leader could expect that
its pricing initiatives would be followed and could initiate a price increase without great risk of being undermined by competitors’ failure to follow or by secret
discounts following an increase in nominal prices. The same argument would have
been raised by the ATP defendants had the case been litigated. Price increases are
highly visible; it is easy to follow a leader’s price increase if you want to. Moreover,
the situation is symmetrical; failure to follow will be quickly noticed and the initial
price increase will then be rescinded with no significant loss of business to the
initiator of the price increase. Hence there is every incentive to follow a price increase unless the initiator has somehow miscalculated the profit-maximizing price
increase, and the potential initiator knows this when calculating the riskiness of
18 The case is often paired with Interstate Circuit, Inc. vs. United States, 306 US. 208 (1939),
where the Court found that the behavior of each distributor of giving in to demands by the theater
chain Interstate Circuit was a radical departure from prior practice and too risky for any one distributor to undertake without some assurance that the other distributors would do likewise. The assurance
came in part from the letter to each distributor from Interstate Circuit with “cc:” notation so that each
would know that the others were receiving the same proposal.
19 This may not explain prices on any given city-pair route. Prices for some of those markets have
fallen dramatically when new entry occurred, although many of these involved markets previously
served by only a single carrier.
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initiating a price increase. (The airlines would of course have denied that prices
were in fact above competitive levels, at least in the aggregate, but to the extent
that they were, it would be blamed on structure.)
This line of defense only works, of course, if it is the case that noncompetitive performance is not actionable under the Sherman Act when it is attributable
entirely to industry structure. But this seems to be the current (and, in my view,
correct) position of the courts, of which the clearest expression is in Petroleum
Products. If this is accepted to be the case, two new problems are raised for a
plaintiff attempting to build a facilitating practices case under the Sherman Act
(and probably under the FTC Act as well). The first is a matter of evidence: how
much of a difference did the facilitating practices make to the performance of the
industry? The second is a matter of law: and how much of a difference is enough
to trigger Sherman Act liability?
3. “PARALLEL

WITH AN

E XPLANATION ”

A third line of defense argument is that, even assuming that there was some parallel,
interdependent conduct, and even assuming that the conduct was facilitated by certain practices engaged in by defendants, the facilitating practices have a legitimate
business justification and therefore should not be condemned or allowed to form
the nucleus of a Sherman Act (or FTC Act) violation. This was certainly a part of
the defense in Ethyl and seemed to weigh heavily in the final opinion where the
court was reluctant to condemn conduct that, at least at one time, had a plausible
business justification, simply because at some later time it may have contributed to
a lack of vigorous price competition.20
It was also an element of the defendants’ argument in ATP. There is no question
that the fact of advance notice of price increases played a role in the process by
which the equilibrium price in a market was reached. Each airline serving a market
was able to see that another had initiated a price increase, and the period between
the announcement and the time the price increase actually went into effect was a
window in which firms could “signal” their acquiescence or “propose” a different
price increase. And there is no question that, in the vast majority of cases, by the
time price increases actually went into effect, they were generally identical among
all the major firms serving a city-pair market.
One could debate whether the overall level of prices was unacceptably high
or whether there was ever any “assurance” for a firm initiating a price increase
that it would be followed. But it is hard to deny that the airlines in some sense
took advantage of the opportunity provided to see if their competitors would be
likely to follow a price increase or to indicate their own acceptance of a price
increase initiated by others. It is equally clear, however, that the airlines did not
create the computerized pricing system for the purpose of facilitating collusion and
20 And, as suggested earlier, the court’s reluctance was supported in part by a belief that there was

a lot more price and “near-price” competition than the FTC had initially argued.
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that the practice of advance announcement of price increases had some plausible
degree of business justification. Indeed, in the settlement hearings, several travel
agents testified that the remedy being imposed (by consent) would disadvantage
their customers by making it more difficult to avoid a pending price increase by
purchasing tickets earlier. Moreover, had the case gone to trial, evidence would
have been presented to the effect that this practice was also employed on routes
where there was only a single carrier, presumably because it was an efficient business practice and certainly not because it facilitated price coordination. (Recall the
importance the court in Ethyl attached to the significance of the fact that Ethyl used
the practices when it was the only firm in the market.)
It is an interesting question how courts should deal with the evidence of business
justification. One approach would be a balancing of the anticompetitive consequences against the efficiencies in a rule of reason context. Measurement problems
aside, this seems especially plausible in a case brought under Section 5 of the
FTC Act, where there are no sanctions and no associated treble damages exposure
and the only consequence is an order prohibiting the continuation of the offending
practices. In cases under Section 1, however, it might be argued that firms should
be immune from liability if the use of the facilitating practices had a plausible (and
non-trivial) business justification (i.e., they were not instituted for the purpose of
suppressing price competition and would have been employed regardless of any
tendency to do so). The court’s opinion in Ethyl contained elements of this kind of
sympathetic approach despite the absence of punitive consequences under Section
5.

4. “W E M AY B E BAD B UT W E ’ RE N OT G UILTY ”
The final defense argument is essentially a legal argument going to the core of the
“facilitating practices” approach. Assume that the pricing (or other) behavior of
the industry is less than vigorously competitive in certain respects (parallel, interdependent conduct which would not be profit-maximizing for any one firm unless
rivals followed). Assume further that there is no evidence, even circumstantial, of
a conventional agreement but that the lack of effective (price) competition can be
attributed, at least in part, to the unilateral, albeit parallel, use of certain facilitating
practices (such as advance announcement of price changes). Finally assume that
there is no legitimate business justification for the use of those facilitating practices. (This is a pretty close description of the facts, as found by the court, in the
Petroleum Products case, and of the government’s allegations in ATP.)
The defense to such an allegation is straightforward: the unilateral, albeit parallel, adoption of facilitating practices does not constitute an agreement for Sherman
Act purposes even if the consequence of the use of those practices is the reduction
or elimination of competition. According to this line of defense, the plaintiff must
establish either that there was an agreement on prices in the first place or else an
agreement to use the facilitating practices (which puts the case into the category of
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cases like Container21 which involve an agreement to exchange price information
that in turn leads to the elimination of price competition). The facilitating practices
explanation establishes neither. The plaintiffs’ response to the line of argument is
essentially the Justice Department’s (unlitigated) argument in GE-Westinghouse –
viz., that the Sherman Act extends to tacit or implicit agreements and that the parallel use of facilitating practices for the purpose and with the effect of suppressing
(price) competition constitutes such an agreement for Sherman Act purposes. In
other words, the response defines the concept of agreement so as to include the
offensive conduct. While this line of argument seems to be consistent with the
Court of Appeals analysis in Petroleum Products, it has not been blessed by the
Supreme Court in that stark form. Rather the more traditional approach is to argue
that an agreement can be proved by circumstantial evidence and that evidence can
consist of parallel conduct accompanied by certain plus factors, In such a case, the
court is likely to rule that, as a matter of law, the possibility of unlawful agreement
cannot be ruled out, and the case will go to the jury with the jury being told that
they are free to infer the existence of collusion, either explicit or tacit, from the
circumstantial evidence.
Part of the jury instruction is not problematic. Indeed, one can think of it as
simply the antitrust equivalent of a good detective story. The pricing behavior is
suspicious and one possible explanation is that the parties actually met or at least
communicated directly and agreed, in the most traditional sense of the word, to
act in parallel. The jury is seeking to determine simply whether the circumstantial
evidence makes it more likely than not that such a formal agreement was entered
into. The problem comes with the rest of the instruction. Assume the jury is not
convinced that a formal agreement has occurred, although it remains convinced
that the pricing is not what one would expect in a competitive market. It is told
that there is a second option for assigning liability, viz., that there has been a tacit
agreement, and that this, too, can be inferred from the circumstantial evidence.
Initially, the jury is likely to think that, like the first part of the instruction, this
too is simply a detective mission. A tacit agreement may or may not exist, and
the jury is being asked to determine whether it does or not with reference to the
circumstantial evidence. The jury instructions may of course refer them to the plus
factors as possible bases for an inference. But a thoughtful juror might well pose
the following question:
I understand, your honor, what factors we are entitled to examine in order to
infer whether or not there was tacit collusion. But I have a more fundamental
question. What precisely do you mean by “tacit collusion”? Can you define it
for me so that I know what I am supposed to be looking for?
Of course, jurors rarely ask such questions and more often are left with the possible
basis for the inference without knowing what they are actually inferring. Does it
mean that, if they find that one or more the plus factors is present, that necessarily
21 U.S. vs. Container Corporation of America, 393 I.S. 333 (1969).
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means that there has been tacit collusion? Perhaps, but if that were the case, the
judge might more properly instruct that the presence of those factors (once the
lack of competition has been established) requires them to find tacit collusion, not
that tacit collusion is merely a permissible inference. That of course goes right
back to the Justice Department’s definitional approach in GE-Westinghouse.22 If
it is not the case that the existence of plus factors (in a situation where there is
an established absence of price competition) necessarily constitutes tacit collusion
then the puzzled juror is back to asking why not and what distinguishes cases
deserving the label of tacit collusion from those that do not. This issue has never
been satisfactorily addressed by the courts.
VI. How to Frame a Facilitating Practices Case under the Sherman Act
This discussion takes us back to the more fundamental problem of the definition
of tacit collusion discussed at the outset and elsewhere in the paper. Assume, following Petroleum Products and ample academic commentary, that pure oligopoly
behavior does not violate Section 1, even where the result is supra-competitive
prices. Take, however, a less clear cut case of oligopoly, i.e., a case where the structure is less obviously conducive to classic oligopolistic interaction of the type that
would not violate the Sherman Act. There may be a larger number of producers or
prices may not be transparent (making it less certain that one supplier will be able
instantly to match the higher prices of another and less certain that suppliers who
have not followed will be detected) or sales may be “lumpy” (making retaliation a
less effective threat because of the volume of sales that a temporary non-follower
can garner). Assume that in this situation there is not direct evidence of formal collusion, but prices (or other relevant terms) have moved in parallel fashion and there
is some indication that performance is not what one would expect in a perfectly
competitive market. Moreover, plaintiff can point to the presence of one or more
of the so-called “plus factors”, including the use of facilitating practices. How can
we instruct the jury as to how they should decide whether the observed conduct
violates the Sherman Act?
One solution that seems not very helpful would be to invoke some phrase like
“meeting of the minds” to identify when defendants have crossed the line since,
whatever is meant by “meeting of the minds”, it is hard to see why it would not be
found in the case of classic oligopoly. In our previous example of pure oligopoly, a
firm initiating a price increase may have a very large degree of confidence that its
rival will follow, but that confidence derives from the industry structure, not from
any specific actions taken by either firm.
Having given the matter some thought, I am convinced that the difference between unlawful “tacit collusion” and lawful oligopolistic interdependence is not to
22 Of course, this problem is circumvented in cases brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act where,

at least according to the Ethyl court, an agreement (whether tacit or explicit) is not an essential
ingredient.
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be found in any phrase that describes the state of mind of the industry participants.
Once we are outside the boundary of a formal agreement, whatever degree of “assurance”, “meeting of the minds”, “conscious commitment to a common scheme”,
etc., that exists in a situation of tacit collusion can exist to the same extent in a situation of (lawful) classic oligopoly. Rather, if there is to be a category of unlawful
tacit collusion which is to be distinguished from classic oligopoly, the difference
must lie, not in the state of mind of the competitors, but on the specific elements of
behavior that brought about that state of mind. Hence a proper instruction would
say something like the following:
Tacit collusion is to be distinguished from pure oligopolistic interdependence.
The latter exists where the noncompetitive performance is largely, if not entirely, the result of industry structure and the firms have taken no unlawful
steps in furtherance of the elimination of competition among themselves. In
contrast, when I use the terms “tacit collusion” or “implicit conspiracy” I
mean that the firms have inappropriately undertaken specific actions in order
to bring about the reduction or elimination of competition. [The court might
then describe the kinds of practices that might constitute unlawful facilitating
practices.] I instruct you that, if you find that the firms have consciously and
deliberately undertaken one or more of these practices with the primary purpose and the effect of substantially reducing competition among themselves,
their conduct constitutes unlawful tacit collusion and you should find them
liable for having violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. If, on the other
hand, you find that the practices alleged by plaintiff to have been undertaken
by defendants were undertaken entirely or primarily for legitimate business
purposes, or that the practices did not have the effect of substantially reducing
competition among them, you should find that there has been no violation of
Section 1.

VII. Conclusion
While I am not wedded to the precise format of the proposed jury instruction,
the basic point is a simple one. The phrase “tacit collusion”, where it is intended to
constitute unlawful conduct, has no natural or unique meaning. Hence telling a jury
that it may infer tacit collusion from circumstantial evidence or even from certain
types of circumstantial evidence (e.g., the “plus factors”) is not helpful since, unlike
inferring a formal agreement from circumstantial evidence (where the jury is asked
to determine whether there actually must have been a meeting or some other direct
method of communication resulting in agreement), the jury has no real way of
knowing what they are looking for. By default, the “plus factors” become the violation, not the circumstantial evidence that a violation has occurred. If certain kinds
of conduct (e.g., facilitating practices) are to be the essence of the violation, the
court should be up front about it. The message that the use of facilitating practices
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could, under certain circumstances, constitute an unlawful agreement was of course
at the core of the DOJ Competitive Impact Statement in the GE-Westinghouse
matter. That message has been somewhat lost in the succeeding years as the focus
shifted to the question of when the use of certain apparent facilitating practices
could be defended or whether the conduct cried out for any nefarious explanation
at all. But if use is going to be made of the concept of facilitating practices in the
future, sooner or later the core question must be addressed. Now that we have more
experience with alleged facilitating practices, the time may be ripe.
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